Wittgenstein and the Methodology of Semantics by McDonald, Fritz J.
Wittgenstein and the Methodology of Semantics  
Abstract 
R.C. Pradhan claims in Language, Reality, and Transcendence that, in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations, “[i]n no 
case is Wittgenstein interested in the empirical facts regarding language, as for him 
philosophy does not undertake any scientific study of language” (Pradhan 2009, xiv). I 
consider Ludwig Wittgenstein’s purportedly anti-scientific and anti-empirical approach to 
language in light of advances by philosophers and linguists in the latter half of the 20th 
century. I distinguish between various ways of understanding Wittgenstein’s stance 
against scientism. Due to the success of more recent work on language, I argue that 
Wittgenstein’s critique, as interpreted by Pradhan in Language, Reality, and 
Transcendence, does not undermine the formal study of language. Nevertheless, I argue, 
the contention of Wittgenstein and Pradhan that language, through grammar (in 
Wittgenstein’s sense), serves a variety of functions still sheds light on the differences in 
meaning across different discourses. I argue that a synthesis of Wittgenstein’s pluralist 
theory of meaning with elements of a theoretical study of language offers the best 
comprehensive account of natural language. I will argue that this conception of language 
is consistent with elements of Pradhan’s interpretation. As Pradhan notes, “The aim here 
is not to project one kind of grammatical determination but keep options open for many 
such grammatical determinations such that the grammatical nuances are not papered over 
in the name of the unity of grammar” (Pradhan 2009, 28). 
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Wittgenstein’s Early and Later Metaphilosophy  
In Language, Reality, and Transcendence, R.C. Pradhan presents a novel, wide-
ranging reading of the later philosophy of Wittgenstein. Pradhan concludes that 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is continuous in important respects with the early 
philosophy presented in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Pradhan contends that 
Wittgenstein, in the Philosophical Investigations just as much as in his earlier work, has 
an aim of allowing a role for the transcendental, the ethical, and the mystical.  
 Pradhan considers the metaphilosophical perspective of the earlier and later work 
of Wittgenstein to be deeply opposed to scientism. In his study of the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, The Great Mirror, Pradhan claims “Wittgenstein does away with the 
purely scientific view of the world” (Pradhan 2002, 134). One cannot have a 
comprehensive understanding of reality based on science alone. Pradhan himself makes 
strong claims against scientism and empiricism. He contends “It is the worst 
philosophical disease to reduce reality to the empirically given facts alone,” holding that 
there are transcendental facts regarding what is possible that extend beyond our 
experience (Pradhan 2002, 143).  
These transcendental facts include truths about language that, according to 
Pradhan, reveal the structure of reality. Wittgenstein, as in his earlier work, understands 
the nature of the world through language on Pradhan’s reading, a reading that 
characterizes Wittgenstein as a kind of Kantian who holds we understand the structure of 
the world through the structure of language. Pradhan contends that grammar, in the later 
philosophy of Wittgenstein, reveals the nature of reality. One key aspect of this reading is 
Pradhan’s notion of the autonomy of grammar. Considering Wittgenstein’s rejection of 
the study of language as a theoretical endeavor, Pradhan concludes, “[g]rammar is 
autonomous, and in a logical sense, constitutes reality” (Pradhan 1992, 13). There is no 
empirical study of grammar, and of the deeper underlying facts about language and 
reality itself, on Pradhan’s reading. 
Drawing on the insights of his reading of the earlier philosophy of Wittgenstein 
from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Pradhan construes grammar, in the later 
philosophy of Wittgenstein, as the correlate of logical form in Wittgenstein’s earlier 
philosophy. Pradhan contends that there is “an underlying unity of the two models” in his 
“earlier and later philosophy” (Pradhan 1989, 140). There is, as becomes clear in 
Pradhan’s reading of the later Wittgenstein, a continuity in methodology as well between 
the earlier and later work. Pradhan holds that anti-scientism and anti-empiricism lie 
behind the ideas in Wittgenstein’s earlier work and later work. 
There is a strong textual basis for the claim, made by Pradhan, that Wittgenstein is 
opposed to the idea that philosophy can present scientific theories about the nature of 
language. In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein contends that philosophy 
generally does not present theories: 
 It is true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones…And we may  
not advance any kind of theory…We must do away with all explanation, and 
description must take its place (Wittgenstein 1953, sect. 109) 
 This metaphilosophical anti-scientism comes through in Wittgenstein’s rejection 
of the idea of philosophy offering a scientific account of language. For Pradhan, 
Wittgenstein rejects the idea not only of a scientific conception of language; 
Wittgenstein, according to Pradhan, does not consider the study of language to be an 
empirical study: “In no case is Wittgenstein interested in the empirical facts regarding 
language, as for him philosophy does not undertake any scientific study of language” 
(Pradhan 2009, xiv). It is worth noting here that the idea of rejecting a scientific study of 
language can be distinguished from the idea of rejecting an empirical study of language. 
If the term science is used in a way that incorporates both the natural and the formal 
sciences, then there are sciences such as mathematics that may be studied scientifically 
but not empirically. It is possible as well for there to be empirical studies that are not 
scientific. History is in many key respects an empirical study of the past, but it lacks the 
precision and the explanatory goals that would make it a science. A key distinction needs 
to be made between the formalism of science and the empirical nature of science: The 
science of mathematics is formal but not empirical; the science of physics is empirical 
and formal; and the study of history is empirical but not formal. As will be noted below, 
the ideas of rejecting the formalism of science and of rejecting the empirical aspect of 
certain sciences should be clearly distinguished. 
The Strong Rationalist Reading 
The rejection, based on Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism, of the empirical study of 
language leads Wittgenstein, according to Pradhan, to contend that the study of language 
in terms of human behavior is inappropriate. Pradhan claims, in “A Note on 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Grammar: Language, Grammar, and Natural History,” that 
“[g]rammar cannot be derived from natural history, i.e. from the way we normally 
behave” (Pradhan 1989, 150). It is clear that, on Pradhan’s interpretation, Wittgenstein in 
his later philosophy of the Philosophical Investigations just as in the earlier philosophy of 
the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus does not, according to Pradhan, think it is correct to 
study language in any kind of empirical fashion. I will call this the Strong Rationalist 
reading of Wittgenstein. 
 Pradhan makes a case for a Strong Rationalist reading of the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus. In “A Note on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Grammar,” Pradhan cites 
Wittgenstein’s claim in the Tractatus that “[p]hilosophy is not one of the natural 
sciences” (Wittgenstein 1922, 51) to support the claim that “Wittgenstein opposes the 
method of discovery since, for him, philosophy and logical grammar are declared to be 
not sciences which can discover logical form” (Pradhan 1989, 143). Given Pradhan’s 
contention that grammar is the equivalent, in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, of logical 
form, Pradhan holds that philosophical study of language in the later works is also not an 
empirical science. In fact, as noted above, for Pradhan the study of language is not an 
empirical study at all. Citing Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 4.12, Pradhan contends, 
“logical form and rules of grammar can not be explained by appeal to any sort of fact” 
(Pradhan 1989, 143). Given Pradhan’s contention that grammar is the correlate of logical 
form in the later philosophy of Wittgenstein, Pradhan holds that the nature of language is 
not accounted for by any fact in the Philosophical Investigations as well. 
Is Wittgenstein a Strong Rationalist? 
Is there indeed such a continuity between the methods of Wittgenstein in his 
earlier and later philosophy? It is not clear how we could square the use approach to 
meaning in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy with the Strong Rationalist non-empirical 
approach to semantics. Wittgenstein, as Pradhan notes, is well known for considering 
meaning to be use: “Every symbol in the language has a use and that is the crux of the 
whole philosophy of language, according to the later Wittgenstein” (Pradhan 2009, 72). 
In order to grasp the notion of meaning as use, are observations of the world and the uses 
of language by communities and individuals not necessary? Consider Wittgenstein’s 
discussion of “games.” The examples Wittgenstein gives for comparison, “board-games, 
card-games, Olympic games” are the sort of things that one could only be aware of 
through experience. As Wittgenstein says in his passage on games, “don’t think, but 
look!” (Wittgenstein 1958, sect. 66) Even the term Wittgenstein uses to characterize the 
relationship among games, “family resemblance,” connotes a certain kind of visual 
experience. (Wittgenstein 1958, sect. 66). Wittgenstein’s method, with its emphasis on 
looking, involves this kind of empirical evidence. 
Wittgenstein appeals to the variety of uses of language in order to rebut the 
Augustinian theory of language, according to which the function of language is to name 
objects. Part of this refutation of the Augustinian theory involves careful attention to our 
linguistic practices. In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein argues his case by 
providing examples of the variety of uses of language, uses that we are acquainted with 
through our awareness of the normal practices of language speakers: 
Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following examples, and in 
others: 
Giving orders, and obeying them— 
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements— 
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)— 
Reporting an event— 
Speculating about an event— 
Forming and testing a hypothesis— 
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams— 




Making a joke; telling it— 
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic— 
Translating from one language to another— 
Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying— 
--It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools of language and of the 
ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what 
logicians have said about the structure of language… (Wittgenstein 1958, sect. 
23). 
Pace Pradhan, what Wittgenstein is doing in this passage is proving his point by 
appealing to the variety of ways in which people normally behave. He points out this sort 
of linguistic behavior to reject the idea that all language functions to name objects in the 
world. 
Wittgenstein’s own method, a method of providing not explanatory theories but 
descriptions of the world that leave everything as it is, does not seem to square well with 
the Strong Rationalist reading. As Pradhan himself notes, “Wittgenstein holds that 
reflections on grammar really amount to philosophical descriptions, not philosophical 
explanations” (Pradhan 2009, 28). It is not clear how it would be possible to provide an 
adequate description of language use without making the kinds of observations 
Wittgenstein discusses in his passage on games or in his citation of the varieties of uses 
of language. Pradhan’s claim that “[g]rammar cannot be derived from the natural history, 
i.e. from the way we normally behave” does not fit with Wittgenstein’s citations of the 
way in which we behave when we use the term ‘game’ or language generally (Pradhan 
1989, 150). 
The Vague Descriptive Account 
As Pradhan rightly notes, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is not a scientific 
approach to language. I contend that this is largely due not to Wittgenstein’s stressing of 
an anti-empirical methodology, but rather his stress on an anti-theoretical, informal 
methodology. As noted above, there is a distinction between the empiricism of the 
sciences, at least the natural sciences, and the formalism of the sciences. Insofar as 
Wittgenstein rejects the idea that the study of language is a science, his claim is 
ambiguous between rejecting the idea that the study of language is an empirical study and 
rejecting the idea that the study of language is a formal study. Given that there is a good 
textual basis for holding that Wittgenstein does appeal to empirical data, the best reading 
of Wittgenstein’s rejection of the scientific study of language is that it is a rejection of 
formalism. Perhaps this is what Pradhan had in mind. Pradhan characterizes 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy in terms of a rejection of strict rules: “Wittgenstein holds that 
language operates not through strict rules but through a network of rules which do not 
constitute an ideal universal logic” (Pradhan 2009, 42) 
There is a textual basis for considering Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism to consist in 
his anti-formalism regarding language and philosophy. Wittgenstein writes: 
The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict 
between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, 
not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.) The conflict becomes 
intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming empty.—We have got 
on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the 
conditions are ideal, but, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to 
walk; so we need friction. Back to the rough ground! (Wittgenstein 1953, sect. 
107). 
It is worth noting, in connection with Wittgenstein and empiricism, his claim that we 
“examine actual language” in the study of language, along with his clear statement of his 
rejection of the frictionless planes of a purely formal conception of language. 
This rejection of strict rules is made apparent in one of Wittgenstein’s key 
examples, the meaning of the term “Moses.” Moses, as Wittgenstein argues in a critique 
of his mentor Bertrand Russell’s theory of names, does not necessarily have the same 
meaning as a particular definite description. To claim that Moses did not exist is not 
strictly the same statement as any of 1-3. 
1. The man who led the Israelites though the wilderness did not exist. 
2. The man who lived at that time and place and was called ‘Moses’ did not 
exist. 
3. The man who as a child was taken out of the Nile by Pharaoh’s daughter does 
not exist. 
In fact, Wittgenstein’s conception of the meaning of proper names seems open to the 
possibility that any of these 3 descriptions, or any particular number of descriptions of 
Moses might be false yet we can still meaningfully claim that Moses does not exist.  
 Wittgenstein, in line with Pradhan’s claim that his later philosophy does not 
involve strict rules, does not think there are a strict number of descriptions that are 
identical to the meaning of the name “Moses.” “I shall perhaps say, by ‘Moses’ I 
understand the man who did what the Bible relates of Moses, or at any rate a good deal of 
it. But how much? Have I decided how much must be proved false in order for me to give 
up my proposition as false? Has the name “Moses” got a fixed and unequivocal use for 
me in all possible cases?” The answer, for Wittgenstein, is no: “I use the name ‘N’ 
without a fixed meaning” (Wittgenstein 1958, sect. 79). 
In order to properly characterize the way in which Wittgenstein is opposed to 
scientism, it is key to distinguish between the Strong Rationalist reading and what I will 
call the Vague Descriptive Account. The Vague Descriptive Account is clear in 
Wittgenstein’s theory of names. What is different between the sciences and philosophy is 
that, unlike the sciences, Wittgenstein’s account of language rejects the idea that there are 
strict rules for language use. This is a respect in which Wittgenstein is breaking not only 
away from his earlier philosophy but also from the approach to language taken by 
Bertrand Russell. The theory of descriptions offered by Russell is flawed, on 
Wittgenstein’s critique, not due to empiricism in Russell’s approach to language. Instead, 
the flaw is in seeking too much precision in his understanding of names. 
As presented so far, Wittgenstein’s anti-theoretical approach to language consists 
in his Vague Descriptive Account of language, and not in the anti-empirical Strong 
Rationalist reading. In considering whether or not Wittgenstein’s approach is tenable, we 
should consider this paradigmatic example of the meaning of names.  
Against Vague Descriptivism 
As an example of Wittgenstein’s approach to semantics, the Vague Descriptive 
Account is flawed. Saul Kripke in Naming and Necessity has argued this convincingly. 
These arguments are familiar, but I will briefly spell them out to draw the consequences 
for Wittgenstein’s philosophy. 
As Kripke argues, names are rigid designators whereas descriptions are not rigid 
designators. A rigid designator denotes the same individual in every possible world. In a 
world where Moses did not lead the Israelites out of Egypt, ‘Moses’ would still denote 
Moses yet ‘The man who led the Israelites out of Egypt’ would designate some other 
person, if anyone at all. One can conceive a world in which Moses’s brother Aron lead 
the Israelites out of Egypt: in such a world, the word ‘Moses’ would not designate Aron, 
but ‘The man who led the Israelites out of Egypt’ would designate Aron. 
Kripke further argues that, even if all of the descriptions we currently associate 
with Moses were false, in the actual world, the word ‘Moses’ would still denote Moses. 
So there is a stronger claim, a stricter rule, than the one articulated by Wittgenstein: 
‘Moses’ could still denote Moses not only if some but if all descriptions associated with 
Moses are false. 
Kripke provides further support for his view by noting the extent of mistaken 
descriptive beliefs among individuals. Many people might have mistaken beliefs 
regarding Wittgenstein. Some people might think Wittgenstein was the inventor of 
postmodernism. Others might think that Wittgenstein was a cultural relativist. Yet others 
might think Wittgenstein was German. If Wittgenstein’s Vague Descriptive Account of 
the meaning of names were true, then none of these individuals would actually be 
referring to Wittgenstein with the name ‘Wittgenstein.’ This is counterintuitive: it seems 
that all of these individuals are referring to Wittgenstein even though they are falsely 
describing him. 
If Kripke is correct, then there are certain rules of language that are indeed strict. 
For example, it is a strict rule that names are rigid designators. It is a strict rule that the 
name ‘Moses’ denotes Moses and ‘Moses’ is not equivalent to any definite description. It 
is also a strict rule that identity statements involving names are necessarily true, whereas 
identity statements involving descriptions are only contingently true. “Bertrand Russell is 
Viscount Amberley” is necessarily true, as both are names that rigidly designate the same 
individual. “Bertrand Russell is the author of “On Denoting” is only contingently true. 
Thus the Vague Descriptive Account, taken as a generalization about language, is flawed. 
A further reason to doubt the Vague Descriptive Account comes from 
developments in syntax. The research program initiated by Noam Chomsky and 
developed by theoretical linguists in the 20th and 21st centuries details our understanding 
of syntax through a theory that is both empirical and precise. If the Chomskyan linguistic 
research program is on the right track, neither Strong Rationalism nor Vague 
Descriptivism is tenable. The problem with Strong Rationalism is that empirical facts are 
used in a significant way in Chomskyan linguistics to establish theories: the primary 
evidence in favor of these theories of language is provided by the linguistic intuitions of 
ordinary language speakers. The problem with Vague Descriptivism is, in the variety of 
theories of syntax developed by linguists after Chomsky, there are strict rules in the 
grammar of a language such as English. To take one set of simple examples from one 
version of Chomskyan linguistics, a sentence consists of a noun phrase and a verb phrase; 
a verb phrase consists of a verb and a noun phrase; and a noun phrase consists of a 
determiner and a noun (Chomsky 1986, 57). By explaining facts about grammaticality in 
terms of general phrase structure rules of this kind, contemporary linguistics has made 
significant progress in explaining our understanding of language. 
 Meaning and Use 
As I have argued, Wittgenstein, on Pradhan’s interpretation, takes meaning to be 
studied in a non-empirical fashion and semantic theories to never involve strict rules. 
Based on a reading of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, I have argued that 
Wittgenstein is not committed to the Strong Rationalist approach to language, but he does 
take a Vague Descriptive Account to certain aspects of language, specifically proper 
names. In light of Wittgenstein’s discussion of games, Kripke’s account of names, and 
contemporary advances in linguistics, I have contended that neither of Strong 
Rationalism nor Vague Descriptivism is tenable as a general methodology for semantics. 
However, I contend that there is a strand in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, noted by Pradhan, 
which does offer a deep insight into the nature of language. This is Wittgenstein’s 
interpretation of the meaning of terms in a holistic framework of use.  
Pradhan writes, citing Wittgenstein: “Wittgenstein does not propose a theory 
construction, however, as he is more inclined to see the connections as they are part of 
the internal structure of the concepts. He writes: 
A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear 
view of the uses of our words.-Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. 
A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding that consists in 
“seeing connections.”…(PI, sect. 122).” (Pradhan 2009, 26-27). 
 I contend that these connections among concepts are best grasped through our 
understanding of the use of the terms that express such concepts. Use, which we can 
observe in each other’s linguistic practices, makes perspicuous the nature of concepts 
through contexts that implicitly give the meaning of a term. 
The conception of meaning as use provides a fruitful framework for accounts of 
the meanings of many terms in language. As I will argue, we can see how Wittgenstein’s 
conception of meaning works through the examples of logical connectives such as ‘and,’ 
moral terms such as ‘ought,’ and metalinguistic and metaphysical terms such as ‘true’ 
and ‘fact.’ 
 To assign a referent to ‘and,’ ‘or,’ or ‘not,’ or to treat logical connectives as 
generic properties or relations would result in a failure to recognize the special inferential 
role these terms play within language. The key to understanding ‘and’ is through its use. 
From the proposition that p and the proposition that q, we may infer the proposition that p 
and q. From the proposition that p and q, we may infer the proposition that p and we may 
infer the proposition that q. These characteristic uses of the term ‘and’ implicitly define 
the meaning of the term. Meaning as use provides the best account of the role of logical 
connectives. 
 These logical terms are not the only terms in a language that are best understood 
through a use conception of meaning. The meaning of central moral terms such as 
‘ought’ are best explained in terms of use. If we simply were to treat ought as a relation 
between agents and actions, we might be able to describe the world, but we would fail to 
recognize a key aspect of the meaning of ‘ought’: its normative role. As Wilfrid Sellars 
has stressed, speakers who accept that they ought to perform action A will have a 
tendency towards performing that action. In “Some Reflection on Language Games,” 
Sellars writes:  
The motivating role of ‘ought’ in the first person is essential to the ‘meaning’ of 
‘ought.’  That is to say, it could not be true of a word that ‘it means ought’ unless 
this word had motivating force in the language in which it belongs. (Sellars 1954, 
350).  
It is in virtue of the fact that the concept conveyed by the term ‘ought’ plays such a role 
in motivation and action that this term has the meaning it has.  Normative terms are 
implicitly defined by the role that acceptance of sentences containing such terms plays in 
leading one to pursue certain courses of action and avoid others. A person who believes 
that she ought to give to charity will have a tendency towards giving to charity. The 
person who mouths the words ‘I ought to give to charity’ yet has not the slightest 
tendency towards giving to charity does not really believe that she ought to give to 
charity. 
 A use conception of moral language allows us to include the diversity of the uses 
of such terms in our conception of their meaning. We use moral language in a variety of 
ways. A term such as ‘ought’ plays a key role not only in our own deciding what we 
ought to do, but also in critiquing each other’s choices, actions, and thoughts. We can 
recognize the tie of the notion of ‘ought’ to a range of what P.F. Strawson termed our 
“reactive attitudes”: a person who has done what she ought not to have done ought to feel 
ashamed of herself; a person who has treated us in a way she ought not to have done 
ought to be resented. Each of these uses of ‘ought’ implicitly defines the term. That the 
term ‘ought’ plays a variety of roles, both in our internal deliberations and our external 
critiques, is no objection to its being a meaningful term. As Wittgenstein would stress, 
there is no need for a single, precise definition of a term such as ‘ought’ for it to be 
meaningful. These varieties of the use of ‘ought’ give it its distinctive meaning in 
language. 
 Meaning as use also provides insight into the meaning of metalinguistic terms 
such as ‘true’ and metaphysical notions such as ‘fact.’ The failure of philosophical 
attempts to define truth as correspondence to the facts, or pragmatic utility, or provability 
has motivated philosophers to implicitly define truth in terms of use. In one version of 
this theory, disquotationalism, our use of the following disquotational schema defines the 
notion of truth: a sentence ‘s’ is true if and only if s. That we reason in this way is clear 
from the truth of claims such as: ‘snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white. We 
can also use this sort of deflationary method to define notions that seem like deep 
metaphysical notions. The notion of a fact seems to function in just the same way the 
notion of truth functions: for any proposition that p, it is a fact that p if, and only if, p. It 
is a fact that snow is white if and only if snow is white. 
Pluralism and Language 
 One of the major points emphasized by Pradhan, in his reading of Wittgenstein, is 
pluralism. Pradhan writes, in Language, Reality, and Transcendence: “The aim here is 
not to project one kind of grammatical determination but keep options open for many 
such grammatical determinations such that the grammatical determinations are not 
papered over in the name of the unity of grammar” (Pradhan 2009, 28). Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy allows, I contend, both strict and non-strict rules, depending on the terms 
involved. Thus there is room to synthesize the insights of Kripke, Chomsky, and others 
with Wittgenstein’s insights of the approach to meaning as use. 
 If we want to understand the meaning of names, it is best to look at how names 
are used, namely as rigid designators. The name ‘Moses’ is simply used, in the 
community, to refer to Moses. It is used to refer to that man. As Kripke stresses in 
Naming and Necessity, in an imagined conversation between an ordinary person and a 
Quinean philosopher over whether Nixon might have won the election, a name functions 
in a way similar to a demonstrative, to pick out some individual in the world. “On the 
other hand, the term ‘Nixon’ is just a name of this man” (Kripke 1972, 41). Names, like 
the name ‘Kripke’ are uttered to make reference to persons, in this case, Saul Kripke. The 
names ‘Bertrand Russell’ and ‘Viscount Amberley’ are used to make reference to one 
and the same individual, Bertrand Russell. Kripke’s insight into the function of names 
despite can be seen as an insight into the use of names. We use names as rigid designators 
and not as descriptions. Like Wittgenstein, Kripke stresses the ordinary understanding of 
the use of terms such as names to make his point. He writes:  
Of course, some philosophers think that something’s having intuitive content is 
inconclusive evidence in favor of it. I think it is very heavy evidence in favor of 
something myself (Kripke 1972, 42). 
In a fashion similar to that of Wittgenstein, Kripke appeals to the ordinary use of terms in 
order to resolve philosophical problems and understand the nature of meaning. Kripke 
goes on to further spell out that other terms, other than names, can be used as rigid 
designators. “Demonstratives can be used as rigid designators, and free variables can be 
used as rigid designators of unspecified objects” (Kripke 1972, 49, n. 16). Note the 
explicit mention of use. We can distinguish between rigid and nonrigid designator usages 
of different terms in the language. Unlike Wittgenstein, Kripke claims that there are 
precise facts about the meaning of certain terms, such as names. Wittgenstein’s approach 
to meaning can be made to cohere with developments in the study of language in the 20th 
century by retaining the idea of meaning as use, while rejecting the idea that the study of 
language does not involve, at times, but not always, precise theoretical claims. The best 
Wittgensteinian approach to language is not committed to Strong Rationalism or a 
general Vague Descriptive Account, but rather allows for both strict formal theories of 
language and less formal theories of certain discourses, such as normative discourse. 
 While a Strong Rationalist reading of Wittgenstein can be called into question, 
and the Vague Descriptive theory of meaning has been refuted, the use methodology and 
semantic pluralism stressed by Pradhan in his reading of Wittgenstein still offers 
substantial insights into the meaning of language. A fruitful approach to the study of 
language in the 21st century will leave behind a strong opposition between Wittgenstein’s 
conception of meaning as use and contemporary views of meaning in terms of reference 
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